Book Reviews by unknown
Cornell Law Review
Volume 29
Issue 1 September 1943 Article 10
Book Reviews
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Book Reviews, 29 Cornell L. Rev. 135 (1943)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol29/iss1/10
BOOK REVIEWS
Declaratory Judgments. By EDWIN BORCHARD. 1 2d ed. Cleveland:
Banks-Baldwin Law Publishing Co. 1941. Pp. xxxvii, 1152.
The fortunes of war alone have not delayed the preparation of this review.
A student of a field naturally hesitates in reviewing its monumental work.
Even the most thorough professor of Evidence or Contracts would approach
with trepidation the reviewing of Wigmore or Williston. The difficulty is
even more pronounced here where he author and the field are almost synon-
ymous. Just as statutory interpleader is Chafee, declaratory judgment is
Borchard. As the moving spirit in the extension of the declaratory principle,
i.e., the conclusive determination of "the pre-existing rights of the litigants
without the appendage of any coercive decree," from the fragmentary scope
to which common law and equity alike had confined it to a general procedural
tool for the establishment of a larger measure of justice among men, Professor
Borchard's articulation of this process has, since the publication of the first
edition, had a most profound influence. This has been especially so since the
work is in the Wigmore tradition-not merely a cyclopedia of case law, but a
* comprehensive, tightly reasoned analysis of all the ramifications of the subject.
When the first edition was prepared the declaratory judgment was fairly
well established in the states and was just emerging relatively unscathed from
a bath of fire in the federal courts. In the seven years which have elapsed
between editions the device can truly be said to have reached maturity. Its
usefulness has meanwhile proved itself with respect to almost every type of
substantive right, and with a few exceptions-notably, in Pennsylvania and
Maryland 2-broad interpretation has permitted the effective operation of the
remedy. Hence a second edition was particularly pertinent. That the collec-
tion of cases is brought up to date is of course convenient; but the profession
is especially fortunate to have the benefit at this time of Professor Borchard's
reanalysis of the field.
And a reanalysis it is. It has not been just a matter of renovating footnotes.
There are seven entirely new chapters, everyone of them on important topics:
Jurisdiction, Parties, Taxation, Public Officers, Insurance Policies, Patents,
and the Civil Adjudication of "Penal" Legislation. There has been added a
collection of forms, based for the most part on adjudicated language. The old
chapters show evidence of having been thought through and recast in the light
of interim developments.
That they also be interesting is probably too much to ask of law books which
are thorough and complete. And the practicing lawyer, alert to the possibilities
of the declaratory judgment remedy, is glad enough to have in well organized
form Professor Borchard's thoughts and collections of material. Here, he
has the windfall of interesting reading as well. Any lawyer who is sensitive
'Hotchkiss Professor of Law, Yale University; co-draftsman of the Uniform Declara-
tory Judgments Act and of federal and state acts and rules.2See pp. 318 et seq.
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at all to the role of law in society will find this volume (except for a few
technical sections) worthy of his attention beyond ad hoc needs. This is due
in part to the fact that the work is free from the mechanical outlook from
which so many procedural manuals-admittedly useful-often suffer; in part
to an eye-inviting typography and make-u4p (the volume reminds one of a
limited edition of, say, Boccaccio) ; and in part to the breadth of the author's
scholarship. With respect to the latter, I do not happen to be familiar with
Professor Borchard's views on post-war issues, but it is apparent that as to
legal sources he is no isolationist. Indeed, the "practical" lawyer, while con-
ceding the value of the,English, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand cases,
which would otherwise be, virtually inaccessible, may feel that the references
to German, Balkan, and Indian cases are "globaloney."
While favoring such wide coverage of authorities, I wish that in some in-
stances more attention had been given to the differences of context in which
'declaratory judgment problems arise in different systems of law. For example,
in ruling on the availability of declaratory judgment against administrative
officers or between agencies, the courts are naturally affected by such broad
considerations as their view as to the relation of the citizen to his government,
or narrower matters such as the method of administrative review available
(as to which in the case of British, federal, and state systems there are serious
differences). The federal courts have put many hobbles (perhaps too many)
on declaratory relief against public officers which have little recognition in the
state courts; for example, the requirement of the exhaustion of administrative
remedies is a considerably stronger doctrine in the federal courts.
There is one persistent problem in suits against public officers which de-
serves more attention in what is otherwise a thoroughgoing chapter on Parties
-the question of the indispensability of the superior officer in a suit against a
subordinate. While this matter is by no means exclusively a declaratory judg-
ment question, it is a frequent problem in declaratory judgment actions against
officers; and Professor Borchard's analysis of the problem might have helped
clarify a picture which the courts have steadily been obfuscating.
When this volume first came off the press, it appeared desirable that more
attention be devoted in it to the application of the declaratory remedy in tax
cases in the federal courts.3 But that need has abated since the Supreme Court
in Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffnwu 4 has more or less cleared the
waters.
Thoughtful reading of law books, except when compelled by direct pro-
fessional necessity, is hardly to be expected in these times. Yet we must
remember, in the heat of the world conflict, that efforts toward a decent pro-
cedure all tend to make more real the objectives for which the Nation is fight-
ing. And, in particular, the wider availability of a workable declaratory jtdg-
3See, however, pp. 367, 234, and 828.
4 U. S. -, 63 Sup. Ct. 1070 (1943).
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ment procedure is an essential aspect of the attainment of one of the Four
Freedoms-Freedom from Fear.
James A. Pike*
Washington, D. C.
Federal Taxes on Corporations 1942-43. By ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY.
New York: The Ronald Press Company. 1943. 2 vols. Pp. xii, 1056:
xii, 981.
Mr. Robert Montgomery's annual treatises on federal taxes, the first of
which was published, I believe, in 1917, have become almost as reliable a time
guide as the solar system. These treatises have been of excellent quality and
have uniformly reflected the long experience of Mr. Montgomery and his
associates in the field of federal taxation and in the art of compiling and
restating the general principles established by the law, the Treasury Depart-
ment regulations, and court decisions. Lawyers, accountants, and other per-
sons required to struggle with the intricacies of the law of federal income
taxation should be deeply grateful to Mr. Montgomery for his perseverance.
Perhaps of all the possible reviewers of Mr. Montgomery's work, the writer
of this review is most aware of the terrific amount of laborious work required
in editing a competent treatise on federal taxes.
Mr. Montgomery's 1942-43 edition is limited to federal taxes on corpora-
tions, excluding individuals, and is issued in two volumes. The use of a
duplicate preface and of separate indices to decisions, treasury rulings, stat-
utes, regulations, and general .indices would indicate that the volumes cover
unrelated matters, but such is not the case. One volume deals with "Tax
Determination and Returns" and the other with "Gross Income and. Deduc-
tions." The two books together take up a little over 2,000 pages. In method,
treatment, and citation, the books follow the pattern of Montgomery's Hand-
boocs of prior years. For example, this edition contains substantially the
same number of pages as the single volume book written and published by
Mr. Montgomery a decade ago.
The task of holding the subject of federal income taxes (and other selected
federal taxes) within the physical limit of 2,000 pages is a difficult one.
Under the "Handbook" method of treatment, it is necessary that the discus-
sion of general principles be either subordinated or omitted. There is in Mr.
Montgomery's work but a very limited statement of the rules of statutory
construction (although he specifically recognizes that "In many cases coi,-
struction of our taxaws turns upon a single word or punctuation mark"),
of principles controlling the determination of fair market value, the extremely
important concept of the equivalent of cash doctrine, principles of estoppel,
election, and res judicata, the applicability of local property rules, and the
doctrine of corporate entity. The handbook method also makes it often neces-
*Attorney, Securities and Exchange Commission, on leave; Ensign, United States Naval
Reserve.
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sary to search the cited decisions to ascertain the fundamental concepts which
*support the indicated conclusion. For example, although the significant deci-
sions (prior to the date of publication) dealing with stock dividends are cited,
there is no adequate discussion of the theory which controls the recognition
of gain on the receipt of a dividend in stock of the issuing corporation.
Certain of these-omissions might be partially compensated for by the in-
corporation of a more compendious subject index. For example, it might be
possible for the user to work out various examples illustrating the equivalent
of cash concept by use of a detailed subject index, but the term, "equivalent
of cash," is not even used in the subject index of either volume.
The "Handbook" treatment also makes it necessary to restrict the discus-
sion to the statute as it stands at present, Wvithout a discussion, for the most
part, of the law controlling tax liability for years prior to 1942 and without
development of the legislative history and the various changes in the statute
which have taken place from time to time.
Perhaps these criticisms are largely matters of personal preference since
it is Mr. Montgomery's intention, as stated in his preface, to "hit only the
high spots." This, the 1942-43 edition does, and does extremely well. No
tax book is perfect, and it is too much to expect that two individuals would
do a treatise alike. It is much easier to write a review than the book itself.
The best antidote for anyone who thinks otherwise is to try both.
If you have current tax problems, you will undoubtedly want Montgomery's
1942-43 edition in your library. There is much more time and skill in-
corporated into the two volumes than you individually pay for.
Jacob Mertens, Jr.*
New York, New York
New World Constitutional Harmony: A Pan-Americanadian Pano-
rama. By GEORGE JAFFIN. New York: The Columbia Law Review.
1942. Pp. 53.
The contents of this little volume first appeared in the April 1942 issue of
the Columbia Law Review (Vol. XLII, No. 4). According to the publisher's
foreword, it is to be the first of several essays, all part of a commendable
long-range policy of contributing to a broader understanding of the legal and
constitutional institutions and ideals common to the nations of the Western
Hemisphere.
The announced purposeof this initial essay is to provide a comparative
study of Western Hemisphere nations' constitutional guarantees of private
rights. As respects such guarantees it is the author's contention that the
United States, Canada, and the republics of Romance America have basically
similar institutions resulting in part from the fact that the Constitution of
the United States served so many of the latter states as a model. During the
past century, however, little effort has been made to nourish and extend this
*Member, New York Bar.
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community of interest in constitutional liberties and their enforcement. North
American scholars, particularly, says Mr. Jaffin, have failed to realize the
improvements which Latin American states have made upon the model fur-
nished by the Philadelphia instrument.
By way of illustrating these improvements the author cites the inclusion of
various economic and social welfare guarantees in the Uruguayan and other
constitutions south of the Rio Grande and the absence of that type of provi-
sion in the bill of rights of the United States Constitution. Further evidence
of progress beyond the standard set by the Philadelphia instrument is to be
noted, the author alleges, in the machinery which our Latin neighbors have
provided to vindicate and maintain constitutional rights granted individuals
when such rights are in jeopardy. He notes particularly the recurso de in-
constituciomli'dad, prevalent in Cuba and other Latin American republics,
the Mexican amparo, and the Colombian acci6n piiblica and acci6n popular.
The distinguishing features of all this machinery are the provision for a
special tribunal to hear questions of constitutional right per se and the
privilege of direct access to such tribunals granted the individual when a
specific right is in jeopardy. In the United States, on the other hand, judicial
review of constitutional rights is still merely incidental to the disposition of
general litigation in the ordinary courts.
- As an enterprise in scholarship the essay is rather disappointing. One of
the reasons for this disappointment is the author's failure to supplement his
examination of mere constitutional phraseology with at least a superficial
examination of constitutional practice. Juridical formulas, paper guarantees,
and the elaborate mechanisms detailed in written constitutions are undoubtedly
important and reveal much concerning a nation's ideals and the direction
which its institutions are taking; but they are largely meaningless, even to
the jurist, unless supplemented with some inquiry into actual constitutional
behavior. In a comparative study such as this is ostensibly intended to be,
failure to allude more generously to actual practice may give the casual reader
distorted and entirely unacceptable ideas as to the relative effectiveness of
judicial review in the United States or as to the security afforded rights in
Great Britain where there is no judicial review of acts of Parliament.
The author's excursion into the current discussion about the form of pro-
posed regional federations "or unions of states is still another reason for this
reviewer's dissatisfaction with his scholarly performance. Mr. Jaffin attempts
to refute Mr. Streit's ideas of Anglo-American unity and the rather vague
suggestions for a trans-Atlantic union of "Hispanic states" which occasionally
emanate from the perfervid imaginations of General Franco's propaganda
ministry. It is an interesting excursion and the opinions expressed may be
important; but it requires some thirteen pages in a volume already too limited
in scope to do justice to the theme to which the author's labors are ostensibly
dedicated. Preoccupation with this essentially political issue, moreover, colors
the entire essay and suggests throughout that the author is primarily interested
in pleading for a cause rather than in conducting a dispassionate scholarly
investigation.
1943]
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In all likelihood it is this same zeal for the cause of American Hemispheric
unity which is responsible for occasional statements in the text which even
this reviewer feels called upon to challenge. On page 14, Mr. Jaffin declares
that "in undertaking comparative constitutional studies the first habit to be
overcome is that of American constitutional isolation." In the next sentence
he says that "ever since the Constitution ;fnd the Bill of Rights were adopted
150 years ago, it has been assumed that the American Constitution is the last
word simply because it was the first word on the modern subject of consti-
tutional democracy." It may be that the author intends that these statements
be limited to American observation of Latin American constitutional experi-
ence in which case they might have some justification; but in that case they
shourd have been carefully qualified. As they stand they constitute an indict-
ment that can hardly be maintained; for the fact of the matter is that no
national body of scholars, anywhere have studied the constitutional systems
of countries other than their own more assiduously than have American
experts in comparative public law, government, and administration.
Another interesting paragraph with which this reviewer is compelled to take
issue occurs on page 11 in which Mr. Jaffin implies that the French Revolu-
tion was a failure and that the American constitutional ideas did not succeed
in crossing the Atlantic in the 19th century except in one or two isolated and
unimportant cases. He goes on to say that "had the French Revolution suc-,
,ceeded, Europe might have undergone the constitutional transformation of
the Americas during the 19th century. Instead of a Constitution, came a
Little Corporal; Waterloo was followed by the Congress of Vienna, the Holy
Alliance, the German Confederation and the creation of the German Empire
by Bismarck." The implications of this amazing, condensed survey of the
political and constitutional evolution of Europe in the 19th century will cause
more than one prominent historian to wonder about the correctness of both
his facts and his conclusions; and the compilers of the dozen or more written
-Constitutions which France formulated after the fall of the Bastille will feel
definitely superfluous.
The nub of the matter appears to be that Mr. Jaffin was more interested in
submitting a brief for the cause of hemispheric solidarity than in writing the
comparative study of constitutional guarantees in the Americas which his
publishers announced he would write. The cause is a good one and this re-
viewer shares the author's enthusiasm in a measure. Moreover, since other
essays are to follow on the same subject of Pan-American, or as the author
insists, Pan-Americanadian constitutional and legal ideas, it may well be that
this initial essay will have performed a useful role. It has at least demon-
strated that there is a prodigi6us amount of work to be done by legal scholars
on both sides of the Rio Grande, and that the product of their scholarship
might aid immensel) in furthering hemispheric understanding and possibly
provide enduring institutional foundations for the political unity of the
Americas. Arnold J. Zurcher*
New York, New York
*Director, Institute on Postwar Reconstruction, and Professor of Political Science,
New York University.
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Photographic Evidence: Preparation and Presentation. By CHARLES C.
SCOTT. Kansas City, Missouri: Vernon Law Book Company. 1942.
Pp. xxxii, 922.
" ...all knowledge purveys to the law, and from the domains of every
art and science it draws the weapons by which it discovers truth and con-
founds error."'
The history of the camera in court discredits the popular belief that the
judicial mind is slow to accept innovations. But twenty years after Talbot
and Daguerre fiist made public their discoveries 2 and nearly a half century
before fully corrected lenses and plates of general utility made photography
reliable and generally available, an American appellate court case3 declared
photographs to be admissible in evidence when relevant and when properly
verified. Thenceforward picttires of one species or another have played an
important role in the judicial process. More often they have been in the
foreground. Sometimes they have been in the background, but nearly always
they have been there. Accordingly it is of interest that not until that one
hundred third year of the science and art of photography did there appear
this first handbook with regard to its relation to legal matters and its place
in courts of justice. The estimable Mr. Osborn has dealt thoroughly with the
field of handwriting and general documentary evidence and its photographic
aspects ;4 and there have appeared from time to time works on ballistics and
fingerprinting, necessarily treating the photographic problems involved. But
there seems heretofore to have been no comprehensive manual of photography
for evidentiay purposes nor an extensive compilation of case law with respect
thereto. I
It is appropriate that one who is both lawyer and photographer should
essay this first such volume.. An ethical and adequate husbanding of the
rights of his client obligates the practicing attorney to use every weapon at
his command "to discover truth and confound error." The advent of the
photograph and the commonness of its appearance in court 5 place upon him
a duty to acquaint himself with the possibilities of use of pictorial evidence.
It is not enough, though it is essential, to know the law with regard to the
admissibility of a photograph-its competence, its materiality, its relevance.
One must know also whether the photograph in question is a fair representa-
tion of its subject. Only when he has ascertained that every photograph in-
tended for use as evidence reproduces the object photographed with the
highest degree of fidelity of which the photographic process is capable has
1Commonwealth v. Roller. 100 Pa. Super. Ct. 125 (1930). Quoted in the preface to
Mr. Scott's book.
21839.
3Luco v. United States, 23 How. 515 '(U. S. 1859).4 OsBoRN, QUESTIONED DOCUMENTS (2d ed. 1929); OSBORN, THE PROBLEM OF PROOF(1926).
GAccording to the author, "... in nearly half of today's cases photographic evidence
forms an important part of the proof upon which the rights of litigants are determined."
p. 2.
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he properly represented his client. The average non-photographer, uninitiated
as he is into th6 relatively simple terminology of the photographic science,6
is, in every instance in which photographic evidence plays a part, simply
incapable of serving his client as he ought. Apparently with this in mind,
Mr. Scott first draws upon his experience as a legal photographer to present
a thoroughgoing manual of preparation of photographic evidence, and then,
in Part II; turns his attention to a classification and exposition of what he
believes to be "all of the cases, state and federal, involving the use and
admissibility of photographs as evidence."' 7 That lawyer who is familiar with
the principles and processes set forth in Part I is in a position not only to
prepare properly his own evidence but also to subject to intelligent scrutiny
the photographs of the opposition. Especially helpful are illugtrations of the
proper procedure for verification of evidence photographs and suggested
questions for use in examining witnesse§ of the opposition with respect to a
photograph in issue.
One hundred eighty-six full page reproductions of photographs illustrate
the text and serve well to point up many of the author's arguments. For
example, there is a series of three photographs of the same skid mark, one
reasonably accurate and two exaggerating and minimizing amazingly the
length of the mark. Accompanying each photograph is a picture of the posi-
tion of the camera used to obtain it and a statement of the type lens used.
The steepness of steps, the seriousness of an obstruction at an intersection,
the depth of a pavement defect-these and numerous other items are photo-
graphed properly and improperly to illustrate how to prepare accuiate pictures
and to detect those incorrectly taken.
Included also are substantial chapters on medicolegal pictures, disputed
documents, ballistics, and fingerprints.
Comes then a discussion of "all of the cases" involving the use and admis-
sibility of photographs in evidence. Presumably the author's system of
classification is a result of much labor and experimentation inasmuch as there
is no predecessor in the field, acceptable or otherwise, on whom to lean and
from' whose errors to benefit. Classification-wise, the result is excellent. If
the resulting style sometimes lacks that sparkle and excellence found in the
writings of those who depend upon compilers to gather material and who may
therefore give much attention to composition, it is nevertheless clear and
readable. The author breaks no lances for pet theories but rather seems to
be interested primarily in expounding the law as it is. In so doing, he makes
effective use of quotations from and summaries of court decisions.8 The
extraordinary size and weight of the volume are due not to prolixity of the
author but to the unfortunate decision of the publishers to use for the entire
thousand page volume the same heavy gloss paper used for the illustrations.
6The terms are relatively familiar but not generally understood. E.g., lens speed,
focal length, chromatic aberration, contrast filter, halation. The volume contains a sub-
stantial and understandable glossary of technical .terms.7Preface, p. vi.8The summaries, fortunately, are more than publishers' case headnotes.
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Because the book appears to have court room utility, a lighter, thinner
volume would have been far more desirable.
At least one reviewer has expressed the opinion that to laud a work gen-
erally and vaguely is to play traitor to the reviewer's craft. 9 Further he has
viewed with apparent disapproval the type of reviewer who picks "multi-
tudinous minor flaws in the work of a greater man." Seeking an honest
middle ground, I feel the urge to point out what seems to me to be a sub-
stantial omission from the instant volume. The lawyer who makes increas-
ingly effective and extensive use of pictures, as Mr. Scott ably advocates,
must from time to time be confronted by problems as to the propriety of the
pictures taken by himself or by an expert employed by him. How far may
he go in taking pictures of unwilling subjects? Is a picture of a "disabled"
plaintiff engaged in vigorous activity made secretly by a trespasser legitimate?
Admissible in evidence? Grounds for an action for invasion of the right of
privacy? These and similarly obvious questions find no place in this volume.
Although it is by no means beyond dispute that such a discussion should have
been included, particularly in the first work in the field, I nevertheless should
like to have seen a brief treatment of these problems.
Finally, of immeasurable assistance in the use of the volume is its thorough
index. It is a practical book, which will find its way onto the desk of and
into the courtroom with many a practicing lawyer.
John Wesley Reed*
Kansas City, Missouri
Principles of Private International Law. By ARTHUR NusSBAUm. New
York: Oxford University Press. 1943. Pp. xvi, 288.
The author of this book was for some years Professor of Law in the Uni-
versity of Berlin, but was led by recent political events to come to this country
in 1933, where he became Visiting Research Professor of Public Law in
Columbia University. The jacket of the book tells us that not only does
Professor Nussbaum write of his subject against a civil law background, but
that he is (or was in Germany) "a leader in the movement towards legal
realism"; and the author himself states in the Introduction that his approach
is "realistic." We must hasten to add that he emphatically disassociates him-
self from the so-called "legal realists" of America, of whom he very obviously
does not approve. Of this, more later. As to the scope and purpose of the
book: its small size-288 not very large pages, including index and table of
cases-shows at once that in no way is it a comprehensive treatise on the
conflict of laws. Apparently the author has been stimulated by his experience
of the last eight or nine years in familiarizing himself with Anglo-American
ideas and judicial decisions to re-examine his own views, which were form-
9Lyman P. Wilson, in his review of PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS (1941),
(1941) 27 CORNELL L. Q. 159.
*Member, Missouri Bar.
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ulated primarily on the basis of a civil law background. And so, he tells us
in the Introduction, "Many views, previously formed, were re-examined ...
and adapted to wider horizons. A new picture of the whole gradually took
shape in my mind. This volume tries to reproduce it in terms of American
law."
Since the treatment of each topic is so brief, and-to quote again from the
author-"no exhaustive discussion" has been undertaken, the value of the
book for the practitioner, the judge, and the advanced student of the subject
will be limited chiefly to the suggestion of new points of view. For beginning
students it will doubtless be helpful in widening their intellectual outlook and
in presenting brief. critical surveys of such difficult topics as "qualification"
and "renvoi."
Part I of the book, containing some 66 pages, deals with the general nature
and scope of the conflict of laws-the author prefers- the title "Private Inter-
national Law"-and the history of the various schools ,of thought upon the
subject, both in civil law countries and Anglo-American jurisdictions. In
dealing with the "Vested-Right Theory" the author does not sufficientl)
emphasize the influence of Dicey's adoption of that theory, especially as tc
its effects in inducing English courts to recognize the xenvoi doctrine. Noi
does he bring out clearly that Professor Beale, the leading sponsor of the
theory in America, dumps it completely overboard when the pinch comes, in
order to avoid the renvoi. The same is true of the Restatement: it is logically
incoherent and inconsistent in rejecting renvoi in most cases and at the same
time claiming to base its rules upon the (or a) 'vested-rights theory.
In Part II, which is entitled "The Choice-of-Law Rule" and occupies about
114 pages, the author deals with Qualification; Renvoi.; Domicil and Nation-
ality; Formalities of Transactions; and the various theories concerning the
choice of law to determine the validity and consequences of contracts. He
criticizes adversely as inadequate the "place of contracting" theory of Pro-
fessor Beale and the Restatement,' and expresses the view that "'there are
good reasons for the strong appeal. which the intent theory evidently exerts
upon the courts." The reviewer is of course upon record as sharing these
views. Especially helpful is the author's brief discussion of the logical diffi-
culties of the Restatement and Professor Beale in explaining their allocation
of power between the law of the place of contracting and that of the place
of performance. (pp., 173-174).
Part III is entitled "Procedural Questions" and occupies the remainder of
the book. It deals first of all with burden of proof and the general distinction
between "substance" and "procedure." In discussing "my article on that sub-
ject-now Chapter VI of The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of
Laws-Professor Nussbaum in all good faith ascribes to me views I have
never held or expressed. Not only does he suggest that I have "underrated
the juridical value of the distinction" between "substance" and "procedure";
he concludes that "basically" I have "attacked the whole distinction as un-
founded," though, "for the sake of convenience" I make "some concessions
towards tolerating the use of the term [terms?] ." (pp. 187-188). One might as
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well say that when the great biologist, T. H. Morgan, 'suggested that the
word "species" might have one meaning for a taxonomist, a somewhat dif-
ferent meaning for an evolutionist, and perhaps, still a third for a geneticist,
he had thereby rejected the "species" category as useless and attacked it as
wholly unfounded. Nothing could be farther from the truth. So, if I were
to note that one "color" in the spectrum fades off by imperceptible degrees
into another, and that no precise "line" can be found which separates one
from the other, and had added that very likely I might therefore draw the
"line" between the two colors at different points for different purposes, no
one could fairly conclude that I had attacked the color classification in ques-
tion as useless or unfounded. In my article I did my best to caution the
reader against inferences of the kind Professor Nussbaum has drawn by
quoting from a distinguished physical scientist, as follows: "I once more
express the hope that ifi attacking the infallibility of categories I have not
seemed to intimate that they are the less to be respected, because they are not
absolute."'
The differences on questions of this kind between the approach of the
learned author and myself are apparently of a somewhat fundarhental nature
and a review is not the place to attempt to elucidate them in detail. Suffice
it to say that Professor Nussbaum is apparently satisfied to carry on his
discussions in terms of orthodox methods, which at one point he calls
"seasoned methods." (p. 37). These methods include, among other things,
an assumption that certain fundamental terms such as "norms" and "norm-
ative," "legal right," "concept," etc., already have a sufficiently clear meaning,
so that we may carry on our discussions and criticize each other's theories
without further analysis and definition. My own assumption, on the contrary,
is that all these terms are highly ambiguous and need careful analysis and
definition before we can proceed with intelligent and intelligible discussion
and criticism. Consequently, I find Professor Nussbaum's criticism of the
so-called '.'local law theory"-first'enunciated by the reviewer in 1923-un-
convincing: he has failed to analyze or define the term "legal right" so that I
know just what he means by his criticisms. For like reasons I find many
of the learned author's critical discussions of other theories inadequate and
unsatisfactory. 2 Fortunately this is not true in all cases. For example, his
discussion of the unfortunate attempt of the Restatement and Professor
Beale to coordinate what they call "legislative jurisdiction" with judicial
jurisdiction is especially helpful. (See especially pp. 2g-29). The book is
on the whole a welcome addition to the literature on the conflict of laws. Not
least useful are the portions of Part III which deal with Jurisdiction,
'See THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, p. 162; and note the
"Supplementary Remarks, 1942," pp. 182-193, in further elucidation of my views. T. H.
Morgan's discussion of the word "species" will be found on p. 163; and other illustrations
of the problem of language and of classification will be found on pp. 184-185.2For further discussion, see my Unpublished Chapter of the Logical and Legal Bases
of the Conflict of Laws, recently printed both in (1943) 37 ILL. L. Rsv. 418, and in
(1943) 21 CANADIAN BAR REV. 249, and the "postscript" to the same specifically refer-
ring to Professor Nussbaums's views.
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Foreign Judgments, and Proof of Foreign Law.
There is a table of cases and an index. The latter for some reason does'
not as a rule list the names of writers whose works have been referred to and
discussed. One finds references to Bartolus but not to Beale; to D'Argentr6
but not to Dicey; to Huber but not to Goodrich or Lorenzen.
Walter Wheeler Cook*
Chicago, Illinois
*Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law.
